Financiële controle op zelfstandige bestuursorganen by Kuiper, Gerard Martin
  
 University of Groningen
Financiële controle op zelfstandige bestuursorganen
Kuiper, Gerard Martin
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
1999
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Kuiper, G. M. (1999). Financiële controle op zelfstandige bestuursorganen. Groningen: s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Summary
Financial oversight of independent
agencies
In the Dutch context. an independent agency rnay be defined as a unit of the natio-
nal public acilninistrative organization over which ministerial julisdiction is l imitecl.
Thus independent agencies are to a large cxtent autonomous in the execution ol'
their tasks. The capacitics of the minister to inflLrence the execution of these tasks
are l irnitecl to cornpctencies that hal'e been laid down in the rules that are macle
especially tbr thc specific agency. Relative aut()nomy in the execution of a public
task without polit ical interfcrence may be considered necessary fbr a number of
reasons. At the same tirne, the fact that independent agencies are working with
public rnonevs requires close scrutinv of their re\renues and expenditures.
There is a certain tension between the agency's attribute of relative autonomy in
the execution of public tasks and the necessity of f lnancial oversight of the agency's
handling of public funds. The central cluestion of this thesis is. how reqrrirements of
re lat ive a i l tononry in  the execut ion i ind scrut inv of  f inancia l  deal ings can be made
compatible.
The legal arrangements that 
-qovern the position clf the rnany clifferent indepcndent
agencies within the Dutch polit ico-administlative fiamework show glcat divelsitv.
A major distinction is that between independent agencies that do possess legal
personality and independent agencies thal do nclt.
The financial practices of indepcnclent agencies without legal personality are
.governed by the san.re rules that apply to all central government agencies. These
rules are strict and give the ministel and his statf a lot of capacity to influence an
independent agency not only with respect o its f inancial management but alscl with
respect o the rvay its public tasks are being executed. The autonony of these
independent agcncies with respect to the execution of public tasks coulcl thus be
distorted through the use of inappropriate means.
On the other side of a continuunt of f inancial oversight arrangements that ex-
tends from an almost all ernbracing ministerial conlpetency tcl virtually no ministeri-
al competencv at all, there are the independent agencies tlrat possess legal personali-
ty. At present here are hardly any general regulations fbr thc financial oversight of
these agencies. Therefbre the guarantees for etfective financial oversight depend
upon the specific rules that are madc for each of these agencies indiviclually. In
general these rules leave n.ru<:h to be dcsired.
Summarv r89
One of t lre mirin conclusions of t lr is study is thiit a division of labor between over-
sight authorit ies is necessary to cleal with the tension between autonomy and ade-
quate financial oversight. It is argLrcd that the division of labor could best be organi-
zed according to the subprocesscs of the oversitht process: a. infornration gathe-
ring, b. appraisal and c. intervention. The minister should be conrpetent only to
intervene. Collecting and assessing information abrlnt the agency's financial mana-
gement should be reserved for an independent control authority.
Existing independent control authorit ies. such as the National Atrdit Office, are
not suitable fbr the specific day-to-day oversight of independent agencies that is
needed. Instead. the thesis asselts the nece'ssity ol the lburrdation of a new indepen-
dent oversight authority specifically fbr independenl agencies.
Apart from the necessity of the division of labor in the ovelsight plocess it is argued
that thcre is also need fol a special aw with general rules lbr the financial oversight
of independent agencies. Again the rules such a law should contain nray be catego-
rized according to the subprocessc's of ol 'ersight.
With respect o inlbrmation gathering. the proposed outl ine of this law is: a. the
indepenclent agency is recluired to systematically provide data on its basic budget
and expenditure records 1tl the oversight authority and the rninister: b. the indepen-
dent agency is obliged, when asked by the oversight authority, to supply the over-
sight authority with all the infbrrnation it needs fbr the execution of its cclntrol task;
c. the oversight authority is competcnt o collect all thc information it needs within
the controlled agency.
With respect to the appraisal of the agency's financial rnanagement, he law
should pay attention to the extent and the precision of thc perfbrmarrce criteria. In
general the critelia of legitimacy and efflciency as being used by the National Audit
Office are applicable.
Witlr respecl to the process of intervention the proposcd outl ine of the general
Iaw is: a. the minister decides on the total amount of money that an independent
agency rttay spend annually and he is also corrpetent cl give general rules tt lr the
layout of the budget docunrents; b. In additicln to tlre rules that are part of the gene-
ral law itself, the minister is competent to rnake rules about the financial adrninistra-
tion of the agency; c. the nrinister ir ctrmpetent to withdraw or re-clainr f irnds when
flnancial shortcomings are being revealed within thc independent agency and in
extreme conditions he is also competent to appoint an administrator.
Thc proposed clivision of labor between the minister and the ovelsight authority
calls for access()ry provisions to ensure coordination. The general outl ine of the
coordination arranqement that is proposed in the thesis is: a. the clversight authority
infbnrrs the minister periodically i ibout the main results of its oversight activit ies; b.
the oversight authority reports to the minister in depth about serious financial
shortconrings that it has ft lundl c. the oversight authority aclvises the rninister how
tcl deal with these shortcomings; d. the minister is competent o order the oversight
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authority to execute an investigation within a specific independent agency but has
no jurisdiction over the way the investigation is conducted.
The general conclusion of this study is that a balanced arrangement, fulf i l l ing the
requirements of both relative administrative autonomy and vigilant f inancial control
should possess the following f-eatures: a division of labor in the process of f inancial
oversight. the foundation of a control authority especially designed for the financial
oversight of independent agencies, and a general law with a number of procedural
and substantive requirements pertaining to financial management and financial
oversight.
